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A Small Discovery: Avicenna’s
Theory of Minima Naturalia
Jon McGinnis*

abstract
There has been a long-held misconception among historians of
philosophy and science that apart from brief comments in Aristotle and Averroes,
the theory of minima naturalia had to await Latin Schoolmen for its full articulation.
Recently scholars have shown that far from sporadic comments on minima naturalia,
Averroes in fact had a fully developed and well-integrated theory of them. In this
study, I complement these scholars’ important work by considering Avicenna’s place
in the history and development of the doctrine of the minima naturalia. There is no
study to date that mentions Avicenna in connection with this doctrine despite the
fact that he dedicated an entire chapter to it in his Physics, yet Avicenna’s account is
at least as developed as and even better integrated than Averroes’s presentation. The
present study situates Avicenna’s position within the more general history of atomism,
and introduces Avicenna’s “new argument” for natural minima. The argument is
important not only for its novelty but also because it shows how Avicenna integrated
Aristotle’s account of minima naturalia into a theory of mixture as well.
keywords
Avicenna/Ibn Sīnā, Minima naturalia, Atomism, Continuity/
continuum, Mixture

the theory of minima naturalia is loosely one of atoms;* however, unlike the
atoms of Democritus, the minimal parts of Epicurus, or the indivisible substances
of the Mutakallimūn, all of which are physically and conceptually indivisible, minima
naturalia, while being physically indivisible, can be divided at least conceptually ad
infinitum.1 Until recently, historians of science believed that with the exception of
some passing remarks in Aristotle and some brief exegesis by Greek commentators
in the ancient world and then Averroes in the Islamic world, the details of a theory
of minima naturalia had to await the Latin Schoolmen of the thirteenth century.
I would like to thank all the participants at the Avicenna Conference in Park City, UT (June,
2010) for their questions and comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am additionally extremely
grateful to Taneli Kukkonen, Peter Adamson, and an anonymous JHP reviewer for their incisive and
insightful comments. As always, any mistakes are wholly my own.
1
While there is a debate whether Democritean atoms should be considered both physically and
conceptually indivisible, there is no question about whether the Epicurean and kalām sorts are both. For
a discussion of the debate concerning Democritus, see Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 354–57.
*
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Ruth Glasner in two groundbreaking works has shown that, far from having just
sketchy and sporadic comments about minima naturalia, Averroes had a fully
developed and well-integrated theory of them.2 Unlike earlier historians of science,
whose understanding of Averroes’s physical theory has been limited to the Latin
translation of his great commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Glasner consulted all
three of Averroes’s Physics commentaries—short, middle, and long—which requires
an appreciation of not only Latin, but also Arabic and Hebrew. As a result of
Glasner’s careful studies, and even more recently that of Cristina Cerami, we now
have a more complete picture of both Averroes’s understanding of the minima
naturalia and his place in the history of atomism.
In this study, I want to complement this important work by considering
Avicenna’s place in the history and development of the doctrine of the minima
naturalia. There is no study to date that mentions Avicenna in connection with
this doctrine despite the fact that he dedicated an entire chapter to the subject in
his Physics.3 This omission is no doubt due in large part to the fact that the section
where Avicenna discusses this issue was not translated into Latin. Yet Avicenna’s
account is at least as developed and perhaps even better integrated than Averroes’s
presentation. (I say ‘better integrated’ because Avicenna was not limited by the
commentary genre that Averroes favored, and so had more freedom to bring
things together when and where he saw fit.) In order to situate and to appreciate
Avicenna’s contribution, then, I begin with a very brief historiography, followed by a
short history of minima naturalia, starting with the locus classicus in Aristotle’s Physics
and going through Aristotle’s Greek commentators, with a particular emphasis on
John Philoponus. The majority of this study is a presentation of the theory and
philosophy behind Avicenna’s understanding of the minima naturalia that considers
what he took from his predecessors as well as what is novel in his theory. I hope to
show that despite the neglect that Avicenna has received concerning his place in
the history of atomism, he was in fact a pioneer in this subject and actually laid the
groundwork from which Averroes, and indirectly subsequent Latin Schoolmen,
developed their accounts of a natural minimum.

1. historiography
Historians of science have not represented the contributions of natural
philosophers working on the notion of minima naturalia in Arabic adequately.4
Pierre Duhem in his grand Le système du monde has only one sentence in which
he mentions Averroes’s supposed lack of interest in the topic,5 and the usually
thorough Anneliese Maier wholly neglects the contribution of Muslim thinkers
Glasner, “Ibn Rushd’s theory of minima naturalia,” and Averroes’ Physics.
Avicenna, Physics, III.12; the numeric references to Avicenna’s works are book number (in Roman numerals), followed by a period and then chapter number (in Arabic). In those cases where this
number is followed by a comma and then another Arabic numeral, the second number refers to the
paragraph number in the editions of Avicenna’s works from The Islamic Translation Series.
4
For a brief study of the historiography of minima naturalia, see Murdoch, “The Medieval and
Renaissance Tradition of Minima Naturalia,” 91–131, esp., 91–96.
5
Ce texte ne semble guère avoir retenu l’attention d’Averroès, car celui-ci se borne à écrire, en son commentaire:
“il est manifeste de soi que le volume de la chair est limité en grandeur comme en petitesse” (Duhem, Le système
du monde, VII.42).
2
3
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on this topic. Andrew G. van Melsen dedicated approximately two pages of his
study on atomism, From Atomos to Atom, to Averroes’s account available in Latin.7
Norma Emerton likewise reserved about as much space in her work The Scientific
Reinterpretation of Form to Averroes’s theory of minima naturalia, but now with an eye
to how that theory was linked with another important medieval debate—namely,
the theory of mixtion or primary mixture.8
Ruth Glasner is the first to begin giving philosophers working in the medieval
Islamic world their due on this subject. In both an article and chapter of her
book, Averroes’ Physics, she chronicles Averroes’s place in the history of the minima
naturalia. Ostensibly, Averroes’s account of the minima naturalia was, Glasner tells
us, an attempt to reconcile seemingly contradictory claims in Aristotle’s Physics. The
first such claim is Aristotle’s criticism of Democritean atomism, which committed
Aristotle to the belief that all natural magnitudes are continuous and so potentially
divisible infinitely. The second is Aristotle’s critique of Anaxagoras, in which he
maintains that there is a limit beyond which natural substances cannot be further
divided.9 Even more recently Cristina Cerami, while challenging some of Glasner’s
claims, has further extended our knowledge of Averroes’s theory of the minima
naturalia.10 In none of the works of this set of historians, starting with Duhem and
going through Glasner and Cerami, is there ever mention of Avicenna’s place in
this history. Before I can tell his story, however, I need to begin by relating the
origins of the idea of minima naturalia in, first, Aristotle, and then some of his later
Greek commentators, most notably John Philoponus.
6

2. a history of

minima naturalia

world

in the greek

Aristotle introduces the idea of natural minima (elachista) at Physics 1.4, which
became the locus classicus for the doctrine of minima naturalia. In that passage,
he critiques Anaxagoras’s principle that “everything is in everything.”11 Arguably,
Aristotle’s most important proof concerning minima naturalia runs thus:
If the part can be indefinitely big or small—I call a ‘part’ the ingredient into which
the whole is divided—then necessarily the thing itself can be too. So if it is impossible
that an animal or plant be indefinitely big or small, then clearly the part is not such
as [to be indefinitely big or small] either, for the whole also will be such. Now, flesh,
bone, and the like are parts of an animal, and fruits [the parts] of a plant. Hence, it
is clear that flesh, bone, and the rest cannot be indefinitely big in the direction of
greater or smaller. (Physics 41.4, 187b13–21)12

Aristotle’s thesis is that the parts that constitute natural kinds—parts such as flesh,
blood, bone, fruits, and the like—have a definite limit with respect to their size,
Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, 179–96.
Van Melsen, From Atomos to Atom, 58–60.
8
Emerton, The Scientific Reinterpretation of Form, 87–88.
9
Glasner, “Ibn Rushd’s theory of mimina naturalia,” 10–14.
10
Cerami, “Mélange.”
11
For a discussion of Anaxagoras’s principles, see Drozdek, “Anaxagoras and the Everything in
Everything Principle.”
12
All translations, whether Greek or Arabic, are my own.
6
7
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both in greatness and smallness, namely, a minimum and maximum. The argument
for this thesis—limiting the present discussion merely to the idea of minima—is
straightforward enough. Aristotle takes it as impossible that cats, for example,
should be indefinitely small. Thus, any premise that leads to the possibility of
indefinitely small cats must be false. If Anaxagoras is correct, and everything is in
everything such that it is possible, at least in principle, to extract out from a given
substance indefinitely small cat flesh, cat blood, and all the sundry cat organs and
bits, then these indefinitely small cat parts should, again in principle, be able to
constitute an indefinitely small cat. Since the assumption is that indefinitely small
cats are impossible, the premise that gave rise to the absurdity, namely, that there
are indefinitely small traces of everything in everything, Aristotle concludes, must
be false. Later in the same passage, the existence of minima naturalia plays an
essential role in two other arguments against Anaxagoras, but in those passages
Aristotle takes the existence of minima naturalia as demonstrated, presumably on
the strength of the argument that I have just presented.13
According to the medieval Arabic bibliographers, al-Nadīm and al-Qifti,
.
commentaries on book I of the Physics by the later Greek commentators,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and John Philoponus were available in
Arabic translation. Thus, in addition to Aristotle’s own Physics, these are likely the
Greek works to have influenced the understanding concerning minima naturalia
of subsequent natural philosophers working within the medieval Islamic milieu.
Of these, Alexander’s commentary is no longer extant in either Greek or Arabic,
with Simplicius preserving only fragments of it in his own Physics commentary.
Additionally, there are a few scattered fragments of Alexander’s commentary
extant in Arabic but none from book 1.14 As for Themistius’s Paraphrase, it remains
fairly close to Aristotle’s text. In contrast, Philoponus’s commentary exists both in
Greek and Arabic and is somewhat extensive.15
In addition to the Physics 1.4 passage, which is Aristotle’s clearest statement
concerning minima naturalia, scholars also see the doctrine hiding behind
Aristotle’s comments in On Generation and Corruption 1.10 and in On Sense and
Sensibilia 6. On Generation and Corruption 1.10 includes Aristotle’s theory of primary
mixture—what historians of science sometimes refer to as mixtion. As will become
apparent, this passage seemed to exert some influence on Avicenna’s theory of
minima naturalia. As for the fate of On Generation and Corruption in the Arabic
world, unlike the Physics, the Arabic translation of that text is no longer extant.
In addition to the work itself, al-Nadīm and al-Qifti
. mention the commentaries
of, again, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and John Philoponus. Of these,
Themistius’s commentary is not extant. Alexander’s commentary was thought to be
lost, but an Arabic translation of On Generation and Corruption 2.2–5 was preserved
in the alchemical work, Kitāb al-Tasrīf
. (Book of Transformation), of Jābir ibn Hayyān
.
(721–815), but again it would seem nothing concerning our passage remains.16
See Aristotle, Physics 187b27–32 and 187b35–188a2.
See Giannakis, “Fragments from Alexander’s Lost Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.”
15
Philoponus (=Yahyá),
In Phys.
.
16
See Gannagé, “Le commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise In de generatione et corruptione,” and
On Aristotle’s On Coming-to-be and Perishing 2.2–5.
13
14
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Finally, while the Arabic translation of Philoponus’s commentary of On Generation
and Corruption is no longer extant, the complete text still exists in Greek.17 As for
On Sense and Sensibilia, al-Nadīm claims that the work was unknown even at the end
of the tenth century. Still, there appears to be evidence that Avicenna had access
to some form of it, although whether this text influenced his theory of minima
naturalia is perhaps impossible to say.18
In light of the foregoing, Philoponus’s discussions of the relevant passages
are clearly the most complete and latest of the Greek commentaries, and thus
incorporate many of the earlier advances on the topic of the minima naturalia.
Moreover, Philoponus’s commentary (certainly his Physics commentary) had the
greatest apparent influence on Avicenna’s understanding of Aristotelian physics.
Hence, I focus primarily upon Philoponus’s account of natural minima.
The most notable advancement in Philoponus’s commentary is that he shifts
the discussion from natural substances and their parts to the form (eidos) of those
substances and their parts. This shift does not appear to be new to Philoponus.
Themistius occasionally mentions form in his exposition of our passage.19 In fact,
the introduction of form may go back as far as Alexander of Aphrodisias, since
Simplicius suggests that Alexander and Themistius interpreted Aristotle similarly.20
The introduction of form is probably part of the commentators’ larger project of
developing an integrated Aristotelian physics. So, for example, in his On Generation
and Corruption 1.10 commentary, Philoponus situates Aristotle’s discussion of
mixture within the broader context of refuting Anaxogoras’s principle, “Everything
is in everything,” and Philoponus’s theory of mixture developed there presupposes
the account of form presented in arguing for minima naturalia, a point to which
I return below.21
Turning to Philoponus’s version of the argument for minima naturalia, he
begins by claiming, “Every form naturally subsists in some definite quantity, and
it is neither naturally augmented to just any degree of largeness nor naturally
diminished to just any degree of smallness, but rather there is a certain boundary
to greater and smaller beyond which the form does not exist.”22
Philoponus next attempts, in perhaps a not altogether successful way, to defend
his newly modified major premise, namely, that the form cannot exist beyond a
certain natural maximal and minimal quantity. This defense itself goes beyond
Aristotle, for Aristotle merely asserted that natural substances could not be of

Philoponus, In Gen. et Corr.
See Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, s.v. “Liber Sensus et Sensati,” 45–47.
19
Themistius, In Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis, 14, 25–26 and 15, 13–16.
20
Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Priores Commentaria, 169, 5–25. Unfortunately,
while Simplicius quotes Alexander extensively, there is no mention of Alexander’s using form in his
interpretation. Still, such an absence need not be an indicator that Alexander did not re-frame the
argument in terms of form, since Simplicius’s emphasis in quoting Alexander is on the apparent fact
that Alexander’s version of Aristotle’s Physics differed from that of Simplicius’s own.
21
For the significance of Anaxagoras’s principle, see Philoponus, In De Gen. et Corr., 192, 10–16;
and the same for the attenuation or reduction of form; and Philoponus, In De Gen. et Corr., 198, 18–19,
for form’s need of a minimum quantity. Discussions of Philoponus’s theory of mixture can be found
in De Haas, “Mixture in Philoponus,” and Wood and Weisberg, “Interpreting Aristotle on Mixture.”
22
Philoponus, In Phys., 96, 27–30.
17
18
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just any size whatsoever. In the case of a maximum, Philoponus claims that the
form fades, or becomes attenuated (exitēla), the more it must spread throughout
a given quantity.
Indeed no human [for example] would come to be a hundred feet or equal to the
size of the cosmos; for we are not assuming some human in thought but in reality.
Clearly, then, [a real human] cannot be augmented to just any size and beyond
all. Instead, there is a certain limited size beyond which [a real human] cannot be
augmented, for the form extended over a large subject becomes attenuated. (Philoponus, In
Phys., 97, 4–9; emphasis added)

Presumably, then, there are decided maxima beyond which forms simply perish,
as the drop of wine perishes as it spreads throughout 10,000 gallons of water.23
Philoponus next posits that just as there is a maximum, so there must be a
minimum quantity beyond which form cannot exist. It should be noted, however,
that he merely asserts this last point and does not provide an argument for it; for
the attenuation argument that he used to justify a natural maximum clearly is
inapplicable to minima, and, if anything, there would be a concentration of the
form.
Philoponus next turns to a mathematically motivated objection to the idea of
minima naturalia. This objection presupposes Aristotle’s discussion of whether
magnitudes are continuous or discrete from Physics 6, and so we should briefly
linger over this issue. The driving question of Physics 6 is whether magnitudes
such as distance, motion, and time are continuous, and so are potentially
divisible ad infinitum, or whether they are discrete such that a process of division
ultimately terminates in certain indivisible parts or atoms. Despite what we have
seen in Aristotle’s Physics 1.4 concerning his belief in minima naturalia, Aristotle
unequivocally denies that magnitudes are composed of atoms, and instead holds
that all magnitudes must be continuous, and so potentially divisible infinitely.
Moreover, unlike his passing remarks concerning minima naturalia, Aristotle
spends all of Physics 6 engaged in, at times, highly technical argumentation that
magnitudes must be continuous.
Given the seeming discrepancies between Physics 1.4 and book 6, the objection
that Philoponus considers is a pressing one. It runs thus:24 since all magnitudes are
continuous and so potentially divisible ad infinitum, let the purported minimum
amount of flesh, for example, be divided. The resultants of the division are either
themselves flesh or they are not flesh. If they are flesh, then there are quantities
of flesh less than the minimum amount of flesh, which is absurd. “If the divided
things are not flesh, then how will they produce the composite flesh again? If
the flesh is homoeomerous, clearly the parts of this would be flesh too.”25 This
last horn of the dilemma, to which I return again when considering Avicenna’s
account of minima naturalia, can be framed thus: If the resultants of the division
are not flesh, then a composite of flesh would not be uniformly flesh through and

23
Philoponus does not make this final point here, but the example and the assertion that forms
require a certain quantity are given in Philoponus, In De Gen. et Corr., 198, 11–19.
24
Philoponus, In Phys., 98, 13–21.
25
Philoponus, In Phys., 98, 17–19.
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through, but instead would be a collection of distinct non-flesh parts, which the
objector and Philoponus find absurd.26
Philoponus’s response to this objection again draws on his introduction of
form to explain minima naturalia, for, says Philoponus, flesh can be considered
either qua form or qua magnitude. Qua magnitude the flesh is continuous and so
potentially divisible infinitely, in which case there is no minimal magnitude.27 This
is all that Philoponus says here about division qua magnitude and unfortunately
he leaves the notion of division (diairesis) underdetermined.28 Division here could
mean physically dividing the magnitude into smaller and smaller portions or
merely conceptually dividing the magnitude, as in the mathematical series 1, 1/2,
1/4, 1/8, 1/16, . . . 1/2n . . . ∞. Since the mathematicians (hoi apo tōn mathmētōn)
raise the puzzle, one might suspect that the latter form of division is meant, and
yet when Philoponus turns to division qua form, it would seem that he intends
physical division. I return to the suggestion that there are two distinct kinds of
division when discussing Avicenna on division.
As for division qua form, the flesh qua form is not infinitely divisible. Any
division that results in a quantity less than that required for the subsistence of the
form brings about the destruction of the form. To make his point graphically, he
has us take as an example a human. On the one hand, we can consider the human
qua magnitude as, for instance, 6 feet tall. In this case the individual can be divided
into indefinitely smaller magnitudes: 3 feet, 18 inches, 9 inches, and so on. While
there are smaller and smaller magnitudes, magnitude is never completely destroyed
but always remains. On the other hand, if we consider the human qua (human)
form, then, when we divide our ill-fated victim into feet, legs, torso, and head, we
do not have smaller instances of the human form. We simply no longer have the
form of human at all but instead a dismembered corpse. Species forms, in short,
cannot survive division the way magnitudes can.
Similarly, says Philoponus, if there is to be flesh at all, that flesh requires the
presence of the form of flesh, and the form of flesh is dependent upon some
minimal quantity of matter. The inference is perhaps a bit too quick, for while it
seems fairly obvious that the form of human is not fully localized in any part of
the person, like the head, it is not equally clear that the form of flesh is not fully
present in any bit of flesh regardless of how small. The problem is that even if one
is convinced that Philoponus’s arguments work at the level of the species form, it is
not as obvious how those arguments translate at the level of the forms of mixtures.
Whatever the limits of Philoponus’s argument, he has certainly gone beyond
Aristotle and helped motivate Aristotle’s original argument. Natural substance
must have natural minima, since there are minimum quantities required for
the subsistence of forms. As for how Philoponus’s version of the argument is an
advancement over Aristotle’s original version, consider the following. Aristotle
26
In fact, Aristotle also commits himself to the position that flesh, blood, and the like are uniformly flesh, blood, etc., through and through, when he develops his theory of primary mixture in
On Generation and Corruption 1.10.
27
Philoponus, In Phys., 98, 21–2.
28
For a discussion of division within Philoponus, see De Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of
Prime Matter, 116–20.
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frequently notes that substance (ousia) is said in three ways: matter, form, and
the composite.29 Moreover, of these different ways of speaking of substance,
there is a sense that substance-as-form is primary.30 Aristotle’s original argument,
however, was solely in terms of natural (i.e. composite) substances. Thus, at the
very least, Philoponus’s argument in terms of form is a generalization of Aristotle’s
original argument, recasting it now in terms of the more general or basic notion
of substance-as-form.
Still, there is also a sense in which Philoponus’s presentation might not be
merely commentary but a new argument altogether. As noted above, a key element
in Philoponus’s version of the argument is that the form fades and becomes
attenuated. This conception of a form’s being able to fade is not unique to
Philoponus’s Physics commentary but is found in other works by him as well. For
example, in commenting On Generation and Corruption 1.10, Philoponus explains
the difference between generation (genesis) and mixture (mixis/krama) thus:
Concerning generation, the matter of the air [for example] is potentially air but
actually water, while in a mixture what is mixed subsists potentially, not the matter
itself but rather the very form is reduced [kekolasmena]. Because of this it is in potency,
since it is neither pure nor such as it was before the mixing. (In De Gen. et Corr., 192,
10–14; my emphasis)

It would seem that Philoponus has some idea of the intension and remission
of (species!) forms.31 It would go well beyond the scope of the present paper
to adjudicate as to whether Philoponus in fact has a doctrine of intension and
remission of forms as well as whether the historical Aristotle may have held
that theory. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that if Philoponus’s theory of form is
substantively different from Aristotle on this point (and my suspicion is that the
two are different), then the present argument represents a creative moment in
the history of atomism.32

3 . t h e av i c e n n a n bac k g r o u n d
to the minima naturalia
The preceding discussion provides roughly the theory of minima naturalia as it
appeared at the end of the late Antique Period and as it would have been passed
on to the medieval Islamic world. Turning now to Avicenna, his theory of minima
naturalia comes at the end of book III of his Physics, which as a whole is dedicated
to the topic of discrete and continuous magnitudes. Consequently, Avicenna’s
account of minima naturalia presupposes two things: an understanding of his
rejection of atomism—both as atomism was inherited from the Greek tradition
29
Aristotle, De anima 2.1, 412a6–9; Metaphysics 7(Z).3, 1028b33–1029a3; and Metaphysics 8(H).1,
1042a24–31.
30
See, for instance, Metaphysics, 7(Z).3, 1029a26–33.
31
While the later medieval tradition certainly found the doctrine of insensio et remissio in the works
of Aristotle, it was with respect to accidental forms. For the medieval Latin context see Sylla, “Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators,” and The Oxford Calculators and the
Mathematics of Motion, 1320–1350: Physics and Measurement by Latitudes; also see Dumont, “Godfrey of
Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms.”
32
One study that touches on Philoponus’s theory of forms in a significant way is Macierowski and
Hassing, “John Philoponus on Aristotle’s Definition of Nature.”
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and more importantly as contemporary Muslim theologians conceived it—and
an appreciation of his defense and (somewhat novel) understanding of the
continuum. Thus, let me provide some background to his view concerning discrete
and continuous magnitudes.
Perhaps the most important thing to bear in mind when considering Avicenna’s
critique of atomism is the nature of the atoms that he wants to reject. He happily
concedes that there might be bodies for which there are no physical means to
divide them further. He thus recognizes that certain substances may as a matter of
fact be indivisible, and so in a literal sense be atoms. The philosophically dubious
atoms, at least by Avicenna’s lights, are those that are not only physically indivisible,
but also, and more importantly, conceptually indivisible. These are the minimal
parts of Epicurus and the indivisible parts of the Islamic speculative theologians
(al-juz’ alladhī lā yatajazza’u).33 Despite the fact that these atoms were believed to
be conceptually indivisible, they were nonetheless thought to be space occupying
(mutahayīz).
For many it might seem problematic to predicate of atoms both that
.
they occupy space—and so, it would seem, are extended—and yet that they are
conceptually indivisible. Be that as it may, there were a number of puzzles, involving
purported absurdities surrounding continua and their infinite divisibility, that were
quickly resolved if one had an ontology of discrete, that is, atomic, magnitudes.
As for the actual arguments that Avicenna uses to dismiss atomism and embrace
continua, these need not bother us here.34 Suffice it to say that Avicenna believed
that any purportedly indivisible magnitude could be divided into conceptually
distinct parts. Moreover, he argued that without positing continua, the conclusions
of Euclidean geometry could not even be approximated, and yet geometry was
the most well established science of the time. Finally, as for the absurdities that
seemingly arise from the infinite divisibility of continua, Avicenna maintained that
once one properly understands the nature of the continuum, those absurdities
are seen for the sophistries that they are. (I return to this final point at the end
of this section.)
Thus, turning to Avicenna’s theory of the continuum, a complete account would
require a discussion of his theory of matter, corporeality—or more exactly, the
form of corporeality (sūrat
al-jismīya)—and three-dimensionality, most of which
.
would take me far afield from the issue of minima naturalia.35 Instead, allow me
to focus primarily on Avicenna’s fullest treatment of the continuum as it appears
at Physics III.2, with the occasional side remark about the other issues to clarify
his discussion.36 While Physics III.2 is Avicenna’s most detailed discussion of
33
For Epicurus, see Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, and for the mutakallimūn, see Dhanani,
The Physical Theory of Kalām, 90–140. For Avicenna’s knowledge of both Greek and Islamic atomism,
see Avicenna, Physics, III.3.
34
See Avicenna, Physics, III.4. For a study of Avicenna’s refutation of atomism, see Lettinck, “Ibn
Sīnā on Atomism.”
35
For discussions of the relation between matter and corporeality, see Avicenna, Physics, I.2, 4, and
Metaphysics, II.2–3. For studies see Hyman, “Aristotle’s ‘First Matter’ and Avicenna’s and Averroes’ ‘Corporeal Form,’” and Stone, “Simplicius and Avicenna on the Essential Corporeity of Material Substance.”
36
For a discussion of Aristotle’s various treatments of the continuous, which influenced both
positively and negatively Avicenna’s own understanding, see Glasner, “Ibn Rushd’s Theory of Minima
Naturalia,” 11.
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continuity, taken alone it can be disjointed in places. Fortunately, certain remarks
that he makes about the continuum in a letter to the Vizier Abū Saʿd significantly
smooth out the Physics discussion.37 Both texts observe that continuity (ittisāl
. ) is
an equivocal notion, and in the Physics, Avicenna identifies three ways in which
one might speak of the continuous.38 Two senses of ‘continuous’ are understood
relative to something else (Avicenna mentions only one of these senses in his
letter to Abū Saʿd), while the third concerns the continuous considered in itself.
One of the relative senses of being continuous identified in the Physics—the
one omitted in the letter to Abū Saʿd—is said of an object inasmuch as it is moving.
This form of continuity occurs, Avicenna tells us, when
. . . one side of the continuous thing is moved in a direction away from the other,
the other follows it. . . . The two extremities can be two in actuality, and there can be
something actually contiguous after adhering during the motion. The extremity of
what is continuous and that with which it is continuous can be one, but it is termed
continuous in the present sense not inasmuch as its extremity and that of the other
are one, but only inasmuch as it follows it during the motion in the aforementioned
way. (Avicenna, Physics, III.2, 9)

Here continuity is relative to the motion. Thus, for example, if one considers
a train, the engine, caboose, as well as any intervening boxcars do not share a
common limit, and yet they move together such that relative to that motion one
can say of them that they make up a continuous moving whole.
The second relative sense, which Avicenna considers, in both his Physics and
the letter to Abū Saʿd, is the continuous relative to a limit (taraf
), which he finds
.
in Aristotle’s Physics 5.3 227a11–12, namely, “that whose limit is the same as a limit
of something else.” This case occurs when something is continuous relative to a
shared limit that is one and the same for two parts. (In his own Physics, Avicenna
unfortunately gives the impression that there are two subspecies of this relative
notion of continuity: absolute and accidental. In the letter to the Vizier Abū Saʿd,
however, it is evident that the accidental continuity that Avicenna discusses in the
Physics is in fact the continuous in itself.)39 An example of this second relative sense
of being continuous is two lines forming an angle, since each line has one and the
same common point at the angle’s vertex, and so can be said to be continuous
relative to the limit according to Aristotle’s Physics 5.3 account of continuity.
Nonetheless, the two parts are actually distinct even though they share one and
the same common limit.
Avicenna’s account of the continuous in itself, which he perhaps misleadingly
also labels as accidental continuity, is, he tells us, “the definition that is mentioned in
[Aristotle’s] Categories [6, 5a1–2], namely, ‘that for whose parts a common limit can
be found at which they meet.’”40 In his Physics, Avicenna describes the continuous
in itself as that magnitude that in itself has no parts (lā juz’ ),41 but in which one
For the text and a French translation, see Avicenna, Letter to Abū Sa‘d.
Avicenna, Physics, III.2, 8–10.
39
Avicenna, Letter to Abū Sa‘d, 42–44.
40
Avicenna, Letter to Abū Sa‘d, 43.
41
The description of the continuous in itself having no parts is explicitly made at Avicenna,
Physics, III.3, 1.
37
38
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can posit limits in it in an accidental sense, a point to which I return shortly. The
most obvious instance of parts that the continuous in itself must lack is that of
physical parts, as in the case of, for example, the articulation of the bones of the
arm, and, more generally, actual parts, as in the two sides of the angle mentioned
above. Additionally, the continuous should not be thought to have even latent parts
present within it waiting to emerge into actuality. This theory of latency (kumūn) is
most commonly associated with Ibrahim al-Na z. zām
(c. 775–845). Avicenna clearly
.
wants to distinguish his theory of continuity from al-Na .z zām’s,
who believed that
.
an actual infinity of parts are latent within a continuous object.42
For Avicenna, the continuous only ever has accidental parts, parts that result
through a psychological act of positing accidental limits within the continuous
object. Avicenna describes these accidental limits thus:
[They are] like what happens when our estimative faculty imagines or we posit two
parts for a line that is actually one, where we distinguish one [part] from the other
by positing. In that way, a limit is distinguished for [the line] that is the same as the
limit of the other division. In that case, both are said to be continuous with each
other. Each one, however, exists individually only as long as there is the positing, and
so, when the positing ceases, there is no longer this and that [part]; rather, there is
the unified whole that actually has no division within it. Now, if what occurs through
positing were to be something [really] existing in the thing itself and not [merely]
by positing, then it would be possible for an actually infinite number of parts to exist
within the body (as we shall explain), but this is absurd. (Physics, III.2, 8)

Accidental limits thus occur within the continuous in itself when the single unified
continuous whole is distinguished into two (or more) conceptual parts through
some act of positing (fard),
. such as pointing toward a uniform surface and saying,
“this side,” while pointing to the right, and “that side,” while pointing to the left.
The limit in this case—and Avicenna is adamant about this point—arises only as
an accidental result of the positing, and in fact that limit ceases once the positing
ceases.43 Indeed, to maintain that the part still remains after the pointing stops,
says Avicenna, is tantamount to saying that the pointing itself remains when the
pointing has stopped. It is simply false, warns Avicenna, to think that the limit in
this case really exists in the continuum.
Moreover, he warns his reader not to mistake the description (rasm) of the
continuous in Aristotle’s De caelo (1.1, 268a5–6)44 which is given in terms of “that
which can be divided into things always susceptible to [further] division,” as
constituting the essence (māhīya) of the continuous in itself.45 In other words, it
is not the essence of the continuous to have a potential infinity of divisions within
it. Instead, this description is at most a concomitant of the continuous, which must
be demonstrated to belong to it necessarily. In other words, one must be careful
even when one speaks of potential limits inhering within the continuous in itself,
if by ‘potential’ one means, again, something latent within the continuum waiting
to be actualized.
For a discussion of al-Na z. zām
and his theories, see Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalām, ch. II and VI.
.
Avicenna reiterates this point in even stronger terms at Physics, III.5, 3.
44
Also see Aristotle, Physics, 6.2, 232b24–5.
45
Avicenna, Letter to Abū Sa‘d, 43; and Avicenna, Physics, III.2, 8.
42
43
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Avicenna takes up the issue of a continuous magnitude and its divisibility
(inqisām) in earnest at Physics III.9. Here we learn that “the magnitude . . . in fact
is the continuity itself, not some continuous thing resulting from a continuity in
[in the magnitude].”46 While this claim is part of a technical discussion concerning
matter, in general, Avicenna wants to deny that prime matter considered
independent of any form has a magnitude of itself, to which the property of being
continuous is then superadded.47 Instead, for Avicenna, matter is a body owing
to the form of corporeality, and the body’s being a continuous magnitude is due
to that form of corporeality.
As for the divisibility of the magnitude, he unequivocally identifies two senses
in which one speaks of divisibility.
One of them is [in the literal sense of] discontinuity and becoming separated, which
follows upon quantity owing to the preparedness of the matter. The other sense of
divisibility is that it is in the nature of the thing that one thing in it is posited as different
from some other thing and so on without coming to an end, which essentially follows
upon magnitude. . . . The first [sense] is true divisibility, namely, what changes the
state of the thing, whereas the second is only a function of the estimative faculty
[mawhūm]. (Physics, III.9, 3)

For Avicenna, there is, clearly, “physical divisibility” and “conceptual divisibility.”
The first and true sense of divisibility for Avicenna, that is, physical divisibility, is
the form of division that actually brings about a separation and discontinuity within
the magnitude. It involves physically dividing a magnitude into two actually distinct
parts, and in so doing destroying the continuity and so the original magnitude
itself.48
The second type of division, namely, conceptual divisibility, involves only the
accidental partition of the magnitude. The parts involved in this type of divisibility
are the accidental parts noted above that result from a certain psychological
process, namely, division through mere positing. In the present discussion,
Avicenna throws additional light on his conception of the continuous, for we now
learn that within the magnitude there is merely a preparedness (isti‘dād) for being
divided, and “that preparedness need not belong to a form, for it is not the case that
what acts must do so in itself.”49 The notion of preparedness or receptivity is one of
Avicenna’s preferred descriptions for matter (hayūlá). Since for Avicenna matter
has no formal or positive feature of its own, the preparedness of the magnitude
almost certainly means that there is nothing about the underlying matter that
prevents the magnitude’s being divided infinitely. Thus, to the question, “Why is
a continuous magnitude infinitely divisible?” the answer is, “Because the matter of
the continuous magnitude does not prevent its being so divided.” The process of
division ceases only if one terminates the dividing process because, for instance,
there is no fitting tool, or the one doing the dividing could not go on, or some
form in addition to the form of corporeality prevents its being further divided.50
Avicenna, Physics, III.9, 3; also see Physics, III.2, 8–10, and al-Maqūlāt, III.4.
For an overview of the classical context to Avicenna’s claim, see Sorabji, Matter, Space, & Motion, I. Matter, esp. sections 1–3; and De Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of Matter, ch. 2, sect. III.
48
Avicenna, Physics, III.9, 3.
49
Avicenna, Physics, III.9, 4.
50
Avicenna, Physics, III.3, 1.
46
47
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It is not because the body as such is insusceptible to physical divisions as small as
one likes. The preparedness of matter, then, plays the role of the middle term in
demonstrating the infinite divisibility of a continuum, which we saw him mention
at Physics III.2.
Moreover, the reference to preparedness is another way to emphasize that
there are no real or formal parts within a continuous magnitude; for matter is
wholly passive and considered independent of any form that could not bring
about any formal features in a thing. Instead, it is again the estimative faculty’s
positing accidental limits—and so accidental parts within a continuum as small
as one likes—that accounts even for the accidental parts within a continuum.
In short, a continuum’s infinite divisibility refers to a potentially never-ending
psychological process, not to some formal feature(s) actually existing within the
magnitude itself.51
Since Avicenna has now introduced the estimative faculty (wahm) and its product
on multiple occasions to explain the continuous in itself, and the continuum’s
being described as potentially infinitely divisible, a brief word is warranted about
his notion of estimation.52 The estimative faculty is one of Avicenna’s celebrated
internal senses, whose function is to receive the connotational attributes (sing.
ma‘ná) inherent in material objects. A connotational attribute is a non-sensible
property or quality of a sensible or material object. The classic example is the
sheep’s perception of the ferocity of the wolf. For while the sheep can see the long
claws and teeth of the wolf as well as smell its scent and hear its growl, none of
the external senses perceive the wolf’s ferocity itself. Yet in some sense the sheep
perceives that ferocity. It is the estimative faculty that perceives this connotational
attribute of ferocity. More importantly for our story, the estimative faculty is
that power by which imagination (mutakhayyila) combines and divides both
sensible forms and connotational attributes.53 Now, within his Physics, Avicenna’s
preferred language for perceiving temporal and spatial relations as well as setting
up thought experiments that cannot in principle be done—like imagining the
infinite divisibility of a continuum—is always that of wahm and its cognates. Thus,
the role of the estimative faculty in understanding the continuum is literally to
imagine parts within a magnitude in which those parts simply are not present in
any way whatsoever, save as accidental concomitances of the estimative faculty’s
act of positing.
Before turning to Avicenna’ account proper of minima naturalia, let me conclude
this section by saying something about Avicenna’s adamant, almost paranoid,
denial that the continuous in itself has anything like parts or latent divisions.54
To help contextualize Avicenna’s account of continuity, it must be noted that the
mutakallimūn, that is, Muslim (speculative) theologians, had viciously attacked
the philosophers’ notion of the continuum and precisely on the point that the
See Avicenna, Physics, III.2, 8; III.5, 3; and III.9, 3–4.
For specialized discussions of Avicenna’s theory of the estimative faculty, see Black, “Estimation
(Wahm) in Avicenna,” and Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, II.4, “Estimation and ‘Intentions,’” 127–53; and for a general overview see McGinnis, Avicenna, 113–16.
53
For a discussion of the (compositive) imagination, see Black, “Rational Imagination: Avicenna
on the Cogitative Power.”
54
The following is drawn from McGinnis, “Avicenna’s Natural Philosophy,” §2, 78.
51
52
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essence of the continuum is its potential infinite divisibility. These kalām thinkers
simply noted that in order for something to be truly potential, there must be a
corresponding power that can actualize that potential, whether it is the finite
power of some created thing or the infinite power of God.55 Thus, the objection
continues, if a continuum were to exist, and if something is continuous if and
only if it has a potentially infinite number of divisions inherent in it, then, to the
extent that a continuum purportedly has a true potential for infinite divisibility,
there must be some power that can actualize the potential infinity of divisions.
If that potential is actualized, however, an actual infinity of divisions would be
possible, for just let the corresponding power actualize the infinity of potential
divisions, in which case there would actually be an infinity of divisions. According
to the Aristotelians’ own position, however, an actual infinity is impossible. What
gave rise to this impossibility, the mutakallimūn maintain, is only the doctrine of a
potential infinity and an analysis of true potential. Thus, the objection concludes,
the purported infinite divisibility associated with a continuum simply is not
something truly potential, and so must be rejected along with the accompanying
notion of a continuum.
As we have seen, however, infinite divisibility does not make up the essence
of a continuum, according to Avicenna, but is only a description of it that must
be demonstrated. Moreover, as we have also seen, for Avicenna the infinite
divisibility of a continuum refers to the psychological process of positing limits
within a continuous magnitude, and that process is in principle never-ending. Thus,
contra the mutakallimūn, Avicenna can say that were this process ever completely
actualized, then a process that in principle can go on without end must necessarily
have come to an end, a blatant contradiction now on the part of the detractors
of the continuous. Avicenna has safeguarded the possibility of continua from the
attacks of the atomists.

4 . av i c e n n a o n t h e

minima naturalia

Throughout his discussions of continuity and infinity, Avicenna keeps hinting at
the possibility of various natural kinds having some physical limit of divisibility,
which cannot be trespassed if the same natural substance is still to remain.56 At
Physics III.12, Avicenna finally takes up the issue of minima naturalia in earnest.
Interestingly, the Latin translators of Avicenna’s Physics stopped translating the
Physics at III.10—no doubt in part, if not in full, because Avicenna provides some
of his most thorough and trenchant arguments for the eternity of the cosmos
there, a topic that the Church Schoolmen would have wanted to avoid.57 Whatever
the reasons for stopping at III.10, the end result is that neither medieval Latin
philosophers nor modern historians of science have recognized or appreciated
Avicenna’s developed theory of minima naturalia.58
See Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalām, 469–70; and Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalām, 152–59.
See, for example, Avicenna, Physics, III.6, 4 and III.9, 4.
57
Since the Latin translators relegated chapter 1 to a prologue, the numbering of the Latin
chapters is off by one when compared with the Arabic. Thus, the Arabic Physics, III.10 (the last chapter
translated into Latin) corresponds with the Latin Physics, III.9.
58
A further effect was that neither medieval scholastics nor contemporary historians of science
have fully appreciated Avicenna’s theory of mixture, for it presupposes his theory of minima naturalia,
55
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Avicenna begins Physics III.12, which treats not only minima naturalia, but
also the related issues of whether there is a naturally smallest motion as well as a
naturally fastest and a naturally slowest motion, with the following lines:
It is proper to add to these chapters [namely, those on continuous and atomic
magnitudes] an investigation into the continuous preservation of the forms belonging
to bodies and whether they retain [their forms] while being divided infinitely. In
other words, just as bodies are infinitely divisible with respect to smallness and yet
preserve the form of corporeality, do they likewise preserve the rest of the forms
that they have—as, for example, [the substantial forms of] being water, air, and the
like? (Physics, III.12, 1)

The issue of divisibility is raised again, but now Avicenna takes it as proven that a
body as such is infinitely divisible with respect to its corporeality or being a body.
This conclusion follows from his earlier discussion of continuity and division. One
needs simply add the premise that for Avicenna being a body is nothing more than
being a three-dimensional magnitude.59 That is because to speak of magnitude
just is to speak of the continuous. Moreover, as we saw, a continuous magnitude
is infinitely divisible, since nothing prevents its being divided. Therefore, a body
as such is likewise infinitely divisible. Such a conclusion is obviously the case for
conceptual divisibility, but it equally holds for physical divisibility; for again there
is nothing about the matter that would prevent the divisions, and while infinite
divisibility is not the essence of a continuous magnitude, it still necessarily follows
upon being a continuous magnitude.
The question Avicenna poses, then, is whether forms other than the form of
corporeality can likewise weather such divisions. These other forms are the species
forms—that is, the forms that make a given substance the natural kind that it
is—and the “forms that belong to [bodies] on account of mixture [mizāj ]”—as,
for example, flesh, blood, and the like.60 Avicenna immediately clarifies that the
present discussion is not about the conceptual divisibility that is the product of
the estimative faculty, although he does return to it again in the present chapter.
Instead, the primary focus is about the divisions that seemingly reduce mixtures
to their underlying constituents.61
The introduction of the forms of mixtures is significant because, recall, one
of the other important places where later commentators found material relevant
to minima naturalia is in Aristotle’s discussion of mixture (mixis/krama). Avicenna
is thus developing an integrated theory of minima naturalia, and in so doing he
recognizes that it must also account for mixtures.62 Since the notion of mixture is a
technical one in ancient and medieval science, a few words about it are warranted.63
and the objections raised against it arise precisely from an ignorance of his theory of minima naturalia;
see Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft, 3–140, esp. 27–28.
59
Avicenna, Kitāb al-Burhān, I.10, 49; Physics, I.2, 2–4; and Metaphysics, II.2 (all).
60
Avicenna, Physics, III.12, 2.
61
Avicenna, Physics, III.12, 2.
62
For a discussion of Avicenna’s theory of mixture, see Stone, “Avicenna’s Theory of Primary
Mixture.”
63
The locus classicus is once again Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption 1.10; other passages
include History of Animals 1.1, 487a2–10 and 1.3, 511b1–10; Parts of Animals 1.2, 640b18–29 and 2.2,
647b10–30; and Generation of Animals 2.6, 743a1–36. Equally important for understanding the ancient
and medieval theory of mixture, particularly as it relates to medicine, is Galen’s On Mixtures (Peri Kraseōs).
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A mixture is best contrasted with generation/corruption and combination. In
the case of generation and corruption, the initial ingredients become corrupted,
that is, they completely cease to be and something totally new emerges. As such,
the initial ingredients simply cannot be recovered. For example, once a loaf of
bread has come to be, it is impossible to recover from the loaf the flour, water, salt,
and yeast that were its initial ingredients. In contrast, in a mixture, while the initial
ingredients are no longer actually present in the mixture, they are potentially there
and so in principle can be recovered. Because in a mixture, the ingredients are
no longer actually present but only potentially present, mixtures also differ from
mere combinations, like in a blend of cornmeal and flour. In a combination the
parts remain actually present and so the combination is not uniform throughout;
cornmeal, for example, might be adjacent to flour. While much more can be
said about the ancient and medieval theory of mixture, the previous two points
suffice: one, the mixture must be uniform throughout; and, two, the ingredients
of a mixture must be recoverable.64
Returning to Avicenna’s argument for minima naturalia, while he accepts their
existence in both the cases of mixtures and the simple elemental bodies (like
earth, air, etc.), he does not appear to be impressed with Aristotle’s Physics 1.4
argument. Recall that Aristotle reasoned that if there were not minima naturalia,
then the various natural kinds could be indefinitely small or large, but he also
assumed that it was impossible for there to be indefinitely small and large natural
kinds. Thus, Aristotle concluded that there must be minima naturalia in order to
avoid this impossibility.
Although Avicenna does not say so explicitly, he seems to be uncomfortable
with the gratuitous assumption that the existence of indefinitely small or large
natural kinds is impossible. Remember that Philoponus too seemed to have
reservations about this assumption, and even went so far as to suggest a proof
for it. Again, Philoponus claimed that forms become attenuated when forced
to spread throughout greater and greater magnitudes, and so there must be a
natural maximum. He then went on simply to assert that, just as there must be a
natural maximum, so must there be a natural minimum. Unfortunately, it is not
clear why this conclusion follows, since in the case of minima, there is no longer
the attenuation of forms, which was the key element in Philoponus’s proof for
natural maximums.
In Avicenna’s first pass at Aristotle’s argument, which in fact is a fairly free
commentary on the Physics 1.4 passage, he attempts to reconstruct it without the
troubling premise.
If this possibility concerning the generation of animals from their elements were
a real one [that is, if one can extract out from the underlying mixture (imtizāj)
indefinitely small amounts], not only would it be an absolute possibility, but also it
would be a possibility that for the most part refers to what exists. That is because the
mixture of the lesser part precedes the mixture of the greater part, for the greater
part takes in the lesser part. The same holds for the account concerning composition
[i.e. substances other than the elements]. It is more fitting that what is before should
64
For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s theory of mixture see Frede, “On Generation and Corruption I.10: On Mixture and Mixables.”
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exist than what is after, and so it is more fitting that mixtures from the smallest parts
should exist. In that case, elephants the size of cats (to say nothing of the size of
gnats!) would not have been so rare as to verge on the impossible. (Physics, III.12, 3)

Here we learn that the smaller mixture is prior to the larger mixture inasmuch as
the greater mixture takes in the smaller, but not conversely. Presumably, Avicenna
means something, for example, like this: While one can have a milliliter of some
mixture without having a liter, one cannot have a liter of the mixture without
having a milliliter. The milliliter goes into making up a liter in a way that the liter
cannot go into making up the milliliter. He then continues that since it is more
fitting that the prior exists than the posterior, and the smaller is prior to the greater
in the sense explained, then if there are no natural minima, “unnaturally” small
kinds should exist like cat-sized elephants or even gnat-sized elephants. Of course
it is an empirical fact that we only ever experience various natural kinds within
a certain definite range of sizes, and yet again preternaturally small instances of
the various kinds should be the norm if there were not minima naturalia. Thus,
Avicenna concludes that the mixtures making up the various natural kinds cannot
be indefinitely small but have a natural minimum.
Avicenna’s second reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument focuses on the formal
cause.65 He claims in that argument that the mixture alone may not be sufficient for
the occurrence of the species form and that a further condition may be necessary
as well, namely that, the magnitude must be of sufficient size. The reason, he says, is
that the proper function of the species form is to cause the various activities proper
to the species, and it may turn out that these activities can only be performed if
the body is of a certain size. Thus, he writes,
An example, then, is the fact that a human will be incapable of doing those things
characteristic of a human unless his body is such as to perform human activities
adequately. Not the least of [these activities] are that he have a power [qūwa] [that
is, the form of human] and a tool [that is, a body] by means of which he can seek out
and make a home (assuming there is no impediment), and by which he can fashion
clothes, and [do] everything else a human must do to exist, as well as not being such
that strong winds blow him about as so much dust and that the predominating lower
qualities in him [namely, hot, cold, wet, and dry] do not change him. (Physics, III.12, 5)

Avicenna maintains that merely having the right kind of mixture, regardless of how
small, is not enough to explain the occurrence of a given species form. The species
form requires some natural minimum magnitude if that form is to produce the
various species-appropriate activities identified with being a certain kind. As I noted
earlier, Philoponus’s attenuation argument for a natural maximum and minimum
magnitude is better suited to a maximum magnitude than a minimum magnitude.
The present argument seems ideally suited to make up for this weakness, since
Avicenna’s point is precisely that the power of a form becomes inefficacious if
there is not a natural minimum magnitude in which that form subsists. This point
becomes all the more germane in light of the fact that in places Avicenna identifies
the power (qūwa) with the form itself.66
Avicenna, Physics, III.12, 5.
See Avicenna, On Generation and Corruption, 6, 127.
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Having offered his commentary and improvements on Aristotle’s Physics 1.4
text, Avicenna turns to his own understanding of the minima naturalia, which relies
heavily upon Philoponus’s earlier comments as well as on Aristotle’s On Generation
and Corruption 1.10 and the commentary tradition surrounding that work.67 He
begins by reminding us that division is said in two ways: one that brings about an
actual division, severance, or fragmentation of the magnitude, namely, physical
division, and a second that involves a mere mental division or positing that leaves
the magnitude intact, namely, conceptual division.
Concerning conceptual division, Avicenna is certain that there is no smallest
conceptual part. Interestingly, instead of simply appealing to his earlier critique
of atomism to make this point, he offers a different refutation of it, reminiscent of
the “mathematicians’ objection” noted by Philoponus, but now Avicenna turns that
argument to his own advantage. On the strength of his earlier arguments, Avicenna
takes as given that the form of a specific natural kind must “spread throughout
the whole of [the body] with which it corresponds.”68 In other words, when
one considers, for example, some mixture such as flesh, the form of flesh must
spread throughout that mixture uniformly such that the flesh is a homogeneous
homoeomery, that is, every part is the same throughout as the whole.
Since the present argument is about conceptual divisions, a brief comment
on Avicenna’s notion of conception (tasawwur)
is warranted. For Avicenna, x is
.
conceivable, that is, one has a genuine concept of x, just in case there exists in
one’s intellect the corresponding intelligible for x, that is, the essence of x stripped
of any material concomitants. A true intelligible, in contrast to some whim of the
imagination or a vain intelligible, then, must correspond with some truly existing
thing; otherwise, while one might be imagining x, one is not truly conceiving x.
For example, while one might be able to form an image of a unicorn, that mere
image is not the same as an intelligible concept of what a unicorn is—that is, of
the essence of unicorn—and so the notion of a unicorn is a vain intelligible and
so not truly conceivable, even if it is imaginable. This notion of conceivability
underlies Avicenna’s argument that there is no conceptual limit to the divisibility
of homogeneous homoeomeries, such as elements and mixtures.
His argument is a reductio. Again, he takes the reality of homogeneous
homoeomeries as given. Next, assume that there is a conceptual limit to their
divisibility. In that case, if there were sufficiently miniscule magnitudes of which
it is inconceivable that a given species form—whether an elemental form or the
form of a mixture—can be found in that magnitude, then in those intervals either
no body exists or a body of a different kind exists.
If some parts of the body were not to have their fair share of its form on account of
their smallness, there would be an interval [bu‘d] of parts alike in [that] status [that
is, in not having that form] such that either the body would cease or parts smaller
than them (and less likely to bear that form) would remain. In the [latter] case,
67
While it is obvious that Avicenna is responding to the commentary tradition surrounding On
Generation and Corruption, only after a close comparison of Avicenna’s own work with Philoponus’s
Greek commentary and the extant Arabic fragments of Alexander could one even begin to assess
either the novelty of Avicenna’s position or the degree of his indebtedness to the earlier tradition.
68
Avicenna, Physics, III.12, 6.
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this body would be an ordered series of parts, none of which have this form. This
form occurs only through the collection of [these parts], where the collection qua
collection provides nothing but number and its properties, while qua a collection
of bodies, it provides nothing beyond what the collection provides absolutely, save
magnitude and its concomitants of shape and position. Now, none of that is fiery
or earthy, not even in the parts taken separately nor in the whole of the collection.
(Avicenna, Physics, III.12, 6)

The argument, which takes the form of destructive dilemma, is dense, and needs
to be unpacked. The assumption to be rejected is that there are sufficiently small
divisions that cannot even be conceived of sustaining, for example, the form of
fire or flesh. In that case, assuming the conceptual division has been made, there
is an interval in which either there is no form at all, or there is some form other
than that of fire or flesh. The division is exhaustive, since the division leads either
(1) to what has no form or (2) to what has some form, and the in-formed thing
can be either (2a) something with the same kind of form or (2b) something with a
different kind of form. Avicenna does not explicitly mention option (2a) because
the assumption to be rejected by reductio is that one has reached a division where
the existence of the initial form is no longer conceivable.
As for option (1), namely, that there is a formless interval, Avicenna dismisses
it without comment, but his reason for doing so is easy enough to surmise. First,
it is not clear how the whole substance would exist, if at the micro-level nothing
is actual; for the form is the actuality of the substance, and yet it is being assumed
that no form exists below a certain magnitude. In short, it was taken as given
that a certain homogeneous homoeomery was actual, but it now seems that it is
not actual, a contradiction. Second, and assuming that the present option allows
some sense in which the whole substance exits, the language of ‘interval’ (bu‘d),
and particularly a formless interval, is Avicenna’s preferred language for a void
(khalā’). At Physics II.8, however, Avicenna had undertaken a detailed analysis and
critique of the idea of void and found it empty, or more precisely, found it to be
a vain intelligible. His criticism included interstitial voids too, and it may well be
just such interstitial voids that the present option would allow.69 Thus, this option
leads to a known absurdity, namely, the existence of a void, and so there is no
corresponding intelligible. As such, however, such a conceptual division in which
there is a purported empty interval is inconceivable in the sense outlined above,
and so the interval must be conceived to have some form.
As for the second option, namely, that these conceptually small magnitudes are
conceived to have a form other than that of fire and flesh, the larger magnitude
of “fire” or “flesh” above this threshold would be nothing more than an ordered
series or mere collection of parts, forming a heap but not a kind, like fire or flesh.
In fact, on the current view, natural bodies would be no different from aggregates
of atoms, none of which is flesh or fire. In effect, if there were limits on how small
conceptual division could be, homoeomerous or uniform mixtures would be
impossible, but the existence of homogeneous homoeomeries was taken as given
and shown to be not only possible but also necessarily so in the early parts of book
69
It is perhaps also worth noting that Philoponus considered the idea of a “conceptual void” intelligible in a way that Avicenna did not; see McGinnis, “A Penetrating Question in the History of Ideas.”
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III of his Physics, and so there is a contradiction. Of course, it is impossible to have
an intelligible that corresponds with a contradiction, and so again this horn of the
dilemma is inconceivable given Avicenna’s notion of conceivability. Conceptual
divisibility ad infinitum is possible for Avicenna precisely because, upon reflection,
the mind recoils from the idea that it cannot conceive of indefinitely small divisions
of homogeneous homoeomeries.
As for physical divisibility, Avicenna contends that, unlike conceptual divisibility,
there is in fact a natural minimum beyond which a given body is no longer able to
preserve its species form. Avicenna now provides, as far as I can tell, a new proof
for the necessity of minima naturalia. He argues thus:
Whenever bodies become smaller, they are increasingly disposed to being more
quickly acted upon by other [bodies]. . . . So, apparently, when the body exceeds its
degree of smallness and separates off from its collective kind, it would be impossible
for it to retain its form at that time; but, rather, as a result of the bodies surrounding
it, it will undergo alteration into them and become continuous with them. As such
it will not maintain its form until mixed. (Physics, III.12, 8)

The argument is based upon, but not identical to, comments Aristotle makes at
On Generation and Corruption 1.10, 328a18–35. Aristotle’s text treats the possible
reciprocal activity and passivity of substances in which it is mentioned in passing
that the smaller the quantities the more easily they mix with one another.
Additionally, in his commentary on this passage, Philoponus glosses Aristotle’s
remarks, saying, “forms are bound to a certain quantity in order to subsist, as was
said in the Physics.”70 What is important to note is that while Philoponus appeals
to minima naturalia (whose existence was purportedly proven in Physics 1.4) to
explain Aristotle’s comments, Avicenna turns Aristotle’s comments into a new
argument for minima naturalia.
Concerning the details of Avicenna’s argument, ‘collective kind,’ as used in
this passage, translates the Arabic ‘kullīya,’ which, at least within the context of
Avicenna’s natural philosophy, is his preferred locution for the various elemental
spheres of earth, water, air, and fire. Thus, in order to appreciate Avicenna’s
argument fully, I must briefly treat his understanding of the elements and
substantial change, that is, change from being one kind of substance into being
another kind of substance.
Associated with each of the traditional four elements are two primary qualities,
one each from two sets of couplets. These couplets include the qualities hot/cold
and wet/dry.71 Thus, the element earth is a predominately cold-dry mixture, water
is a predominately cold-wet mixture, air is a predominately hot-wet mixture, and
fire is a predominately hot-dry mixture. For Avicenna, these primary qualities are
related to the elements’ material cause. Now, when these primary qualities are
altered—as, for example, when there is an increase or decrease in the degree of
hotness, coldness, dryness, or wetness—the alteration prepares or predisposes a
given element’s matter so that it is suited to receive a new substantial form.72 So,
Philoponus, In Phys., 198, 18–19.
Avicenna, On Generation and Corruption, 9, 154–55.
72
The story is much more complex than I suggest here. It involves Avicenna’s distinction between physical causation and metaphysical causation with its appeal to his celebrated Giver of Forms
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for example, when water, which again is a cold-wet mixture, is sufficiently heated,
the underlying qualitative disposition becomes no longer suited to the substantial
form of water, and so at some point in the heating process the mixture receives
a new substantial form that is compatible with the new underlying disposition,
namely, it receives the form of air. And, indeed, the steam produced from vigorously
heating water does have a definite air-like quality.
Bearing this account of the elements and substantial change in mind, we can
now better appreciate Avicenna’s proof for the existence of minima naturalia. The
smaller the quantity of a given substance is, observes Avicenna, the more apt it is
to be acted upon by surrounding bodies. This is the point that Avicenna draws
from On Generation and Corruption 1.10. So, for example, all things being equal, it
takes longer for a body of water to cool down a ton of molten iron than for that
same body of water to cool down an ounce of molten iron, and similarly, a blast
furnace is able to heat the same ounce more quickly than the ton. So, again, for
Avicenna the smaller the physical divisions of a given substance are, the more
disposed the resulting reduced quantity of the substance becomes to the primary
qualities—again, hot, cold, wet, and dry—of the surrounding bodies. Below a
certain limit, maintains Avicenna, the ratio between the strength of the primary
qualities of the surrounding body and those of the body being divided is such
that the qualities of the surrounding body overcome those of the divided body.
At that moment, the divided substance’s underlying mixture becomes no longer
suitable for its elemental form, and the mixture receives a new substantial form.
So, for example, imagine a cup of water that is surrounded by hot summer
air. Now, imagine half the amount of water, and then keep taking halves. At
some point, the amount of water is so small that the water simply evaporates as
it were instantaneously, or, as Avicenna would have it, the form of water in that
minuscule physical quantity is immediately replaced with the form of air. In short,
for Avicenna, the elements, as well as more complex mixtures like blood, flesh,
and bone, have natural minima beyond which they cannot be divided and still be
capable of retaining their species form; for the hot, cold, wet, and dry qualities
of the surrounding bodies so alter that divided body that it is no longer suitable
for sustaining its initial form. There must be, Avicenna thus concludes, minima
naturalia. In this respect, Avicenna’s minima naturalia are more like our modern
notion of atoms than classical Greek and medieval Islamic accounts of atoms are.
That is because if one takes a certain quantity of hydrogen, for example, and divides
it, one is still left with hydrogen, that is, until one reaches a single hydrogen atom;
for when a single hydrogen atom is divided, it is no longer hydrogen but a proton
and an electron. The “form” of hydrogen is, as it were, lost. While not exact, at
least in certain respects the analogy between minima naturalia and modern atoms
is, then, apropos.
(Wāhib al- suwar);
see Janssens, “The Notions of ‘Wāhib al- suwar’
(Giver of Forms) and ‘Wāhib al-‘aql’
.
.
(Bestower of Intelligence) in Ibn Sīnā,” and Hasse, “Avicenna’s ‘Giver of Forms’ in Latin Philosophy,
Especially in the Works of Albertus Magnus.” Additionally, his account of substantial change requires
an understanding of his critique of earlier theories of substantial forms, particularly how his competing view of substantial form comes to play in his account of elemental change; see, Stone, “Avicenna’s
Theory of Primary Mixture, ” 109–19; and Richards, “Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and Generation.”
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I end this section with one final observation: Avicenna’s theory of minima
naturalia is a small mixture of Physics 1.4 and On Generation and Corruption 1.10.
As such, Avicenna’s theory of natural minima anticipates at many points his theory
of mixture developed in his own On Generation and Corruption 6. Two points in
particular are salient. Recall that for Avicenna, when there are quantities of either
the elements or mixtures that are equal to or greater than the naturally minimum
quantity required for the substantial form, the form spreads uniformly throughout
the substance such that the substance is a continuous whole. Inasmuch as there
is a continuous whole, one can conceptually divide the substance as small as one
likes, even below the naturally minimum quantity, and the substance remains
uniform throughout. It is only when the substance is physically divided such that
the parts are literally separated from one another that the mixture is destroyed
and the ingredients of the mixture emerge once again. Thus, Avicenna’s theory
of minima naturalia with its reliance on two types of divisibility not only lets him
account for the uniformity of mixtures, but also provides him with the mechanism
for explaining recoverability, which again were two of Aristotle’s desiderata for a
true mixture.73
In conclusion, until relatively recently the theory of a natural minimum was
considered to be primarily the product of Latin Schoolmen working from a number
of germinal statements in Aristotle. Recently, Ruth Glasner and others have shown
that, despite the limited knowledge that medieval Churchmen and historians of
science have had concerning Averroes’s theory of minima naturalia, he in fact had
a very developed account in which he grappled with both interpretative problems
within Aristotle and substantive philosophical issues. Hopefully, I have shown that
Averroes was not the only philosopher in the Arabic world working on this issue,
and that Avicenna was at least as vigorously engaged in the issue of minima naturalia.
Moreover, I strongly suspect that Avicenna’s work may have strongly influenced
Averroes’s own reading of Aristotle. Finally, I doubt that Avicenna and Averroes
were the sole thinkers within the medieval Arabic tradition of Neoplatonized
Aristotelian philosophy to undertake this endeavor. Thus, what still waits to be
written is the full story of falsafa’s contribution to the history of atomism.
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